2. The meanings attached to the terms 'philosophy' and 'philosophy of education' by policy makers and educators in other disciplines.
Especially in the UK, but mindful both of the rest of Europe.
3. The difference place and time may make to these meanings, especially across Europe, and particularly in relation to changes in funding policies for Higher Education. 4 . How these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy and philosophy of education influencing policy.
I sketch the contours of this exploration but a thorough mapping would be far beyond the scope of a single paper. Gale Macleod, and this paper draws extensively on our earlier work (Griffiths & Macleod 2008; ).
When we began the investigation we had expected it to be largely empirical.
To our surprise, our enquiry turned out to be largely philosophical in character. We had begun by trying to identify key informants among educational philosophers and in policy circles who would be willing to be interviewed. However, we immediately ran up against a number of problems related to the variety of meanings attached to the term 'philosophy' by policy makers, philosophers of education and educational researchers from other disciplines. We noticed h ow the term 'philosophy' in ordinary English usage has very different meanings from the more technical ones preferred in academia. So we were forced to address the non-empirical question: When The next section, Section III, is an investigation of different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education, particularly educational policy. Section IV summarises some social science research evidence about the actual practices of policy makers in relation to research findings and scholarship -as distinct from the beliefs about it, held by either education researchers or policy makers. Section V presents some evidence using conversational interviews with philosophers of education and other educators. Section VI, concludes with suggestions about relationships between philosophy and policy making. A coda in Section VII points out some remaining thorny issues of ethics and social justice.
III

Philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education
This section addresses the character of philosophy itself, as understood by philosophers and by non-philosophers. I have divided this complex topic into three sub-sections: Non-specialist views of what philosophy is and of its relation to education; what philosophers take philosophy to be; and philosophy of education in relation to educational practice and policy.
Non-specialist views of what philosophy is and of its relation to education
The question of what counts as 'philosophy' is contentious. 'What is philosophy?' is itself a philosophical question. There are some well-known answers. Whitehead's comment is famous (Whitehead 1979, p.39 
The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato, Indeed, Plato's comment in the Theaetetus on the nature of philosophy is itself often quoted:
The feeling of wonder is the mark of the philosopher; philosophy has no other beginning than this.
This was not a view of philosophy that we have found well represented among non-philosophers however. Nor was another often quoted remark (attributed to various philosophers) that philosophy is what is found on the bookshelf in a philosopher's study.
At the start of the investigation we had asked policy makers, and educational researchers who worked closely with them, if they could help by putting us in touch with policy makers who had studied philosophy or who were interested in it. The plan failed. This was largely because we came up against a continued misapprehension about what we could mean. Some took us to be asking about 'philosophy for children ' As we looked for evidence of the influence of philosophy of education, we found these misapprehensions of our meaning were a continual frustration for us. The frustration lasted for some months. We felt we were no further forward in our investigation. It is not that we -or indeed the contributors to PHILOS-L -felt that the common uses are wrong. As one typical post said (PHILOS-L April 2010):
I don't at all think that we should be or feel 'proprietary' regarding the use of the term 'philosophical'. As I hope most of us do, I think that the term should be freely and widely and helpfully used.
It was pointed out that the various different meanings in common use have their counterparts in academic schools of philosophy, for instance medieval speculation (or theoria) on the one hand or various forms of 'practical philosophy' on the other.
After some months we came to realise that, far from being an impediment, the hope not eccentric.
Different answers to the question, 'What is philosophy?' seem to reflect a number of tensions within the discipline. These tensions are by no means simply one-dimensional. They are better described as multidimensional. Two, three, four or more different tensions all need resolution in any particular approach. One of the most obvious tensions is between philosophy as process and as product. It is reflected in the following two quotations from university websites explaining their philosophy courses. The first, from the Open University in the UK, emphasises the process. Philosophy is, first and foremost, the act of doing philosophy (Open University 2010):
Philosophy is different from many other Arts subjects in that to study it you need to do it. To be an art historian, you needn't paint; to study poetry, you needn't be a poet; you can study music without playing an
instrument. Yet to study philosophy you have to engage in philosophical argument (reasons or evidence leading to a conclusion).
Not that you have to operate at the level of the great thinkers of the past; but when you study philosophy, you will be doing the same sort of thing as them.
In Other dimensions occur because the resolution towards product or process is only one of many philosophical tensions. The resolution towards product is itself subject to further tensions. The product may be considered to be a matter of the true or the good. Or it may be considered to be a matter of creativity. Deleuze and Guattari's answer to the question, 'What is philosophy?' is the creation or formation of concepts (Deleuze & Guattari 1994) . Concepts created by the great philosophers may survive for centuries.
Similarly the resolution towards process is subject to further tensions. One of these is about what might count as a dialogue: for instance, questions arise about the role of imagery and about criteria for rational discussion. (For instance, see Le Doeuff (1989) and Lloyd (1984) .) There are, of course, many other tensions and dimensions, such as those deriving from the role of the tradition from (at least) Socrates, and the relevance of political stance.
However a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. This from a woman who was known for her tireless activism, both in education and in labour politics, in which her philosophy and philosophising was an integral part.
Philosophy of education in relation to educational practice and policy.
I do philosophy (of education) myself. Evidently how I resolve all these tensions must influence my interpretation of other philosophers. For myself, I
take it that philosophy is best done in relation to specific contexts, preferably those with which I am engaged. Further, I understand it as taking place in a process of multiple conversations and dialogues. So doing philosophy is less coming up with a series of outcomes and more a way of understanding, of being in the world, including being aware of a number of relevant distinctions that might be drawn when making sense of it and of the self as part of it.
These distinctions may be found in plain propositional terms and also in imagery of various kinds. So with respect to the outcomes plane, I am towards the creativity end; with respect to the process plane, I am of the view that imagery has a place in rational argument.
It is in this context that I want to highlight some challenges currently facing the Thirdly, a range of kinds of knowledge are both usable and used. This finding runs contrary to a widely held view that only one kind of knowledge (information) is wanted, and that it is needed for implementation or, just possibly, for evaluation. Both Nutley et al. and Saunders affirm that 'research' or 'evidence-base' includes conceptual resources as well as empirically generated data. Indeed Nutley et al. say that it seems as if 'research is mainly used by policy makers in indirect, conceptual ways ' (2007, p.36 ). This situation might appear to be good news for philosophers, but it needs to be understood in context. Very little research of any kind is used directly, and ideas seem to be picked up from a range of sources, rather than from commissioned conceptual research (Percy-Smith et al. 2002; Saunders 2007b ).
VI
Interviews and conversations with philosophers of education and other educators
There is very little empirical evidence on how research is used in policy in any subject, let alone in philosophy of education (Boaz et al. 2009 One of these dimensions is loaded for philosophers of education:
contemplation or engagement with the world. Philosophers of education are all engaged with the world of education. They do not intend only to describe it but to influence it in some way. This may be through teaching, through contributing to the ideas circulating in a culture (e.g. in the media) and through direct engagement with other educators. The next most significant tension is process or product. This is a model in many dimensions. Process is itself two dimensional (at least): plain, strict logic or allusive, using imagery; as is product which may be the right and true or a new concept.
In reviewing research about the practices of policy makers in relation to researchers, including philosophers, I noted that the terms 'policy makers' and 'researchers' are ambiguous and misleading because they imply that these are homogeneous, bounded groups of people (the 'two communities' theory).
Research indicates that both groups are diverse, overlapping with one another and with other active players in policy networks. Individuals move between and among these different social spaces in the course of their careers e.g. moving backwards and forwards from universities to government institutions. The process of making a policy happens over time, in a chain of steps, but only occasionally in a series of explicit decisions in a process of conscious deliberation. More often it is an on-going, chancy, piecemeal process, shaped by implementation and often accurately describable as 'muddling through'. This process draws on a range of kinds of knowledge, including both the more conceptual and the more empirical.
It is now possible to see some ways which the philosophy of education can be of relevance to policy makers. If the 'two communities' theory was more accurate it would be more difficult. But, as were Greenham women, philosophers of education are everywhere (Seller 1985) 8 . We embody our discipline, its processes and its products, and we embrace our complex identities as, at the very least, philosophers and educators. We are found in research teams, inside institutions of policy makers, working for and in the media, and we also teach people who will be influential as policy makers, journalists, editors or teachers. All of these groups are influential in policy networks. Moreover we can be active during all the steps of policy making.
We may take part in dialogues as trusted colleagues or, in the honourable Socratic tradition, as gadflies. Or we can combine those roles. Finally, our different practices of philosophy of education provide different forms of knowledge with which to infuse, inject or impact on policy making.
The conversational interviews with Ken Wain and Bas Levering accounts
show how it is possible to intend influence and to use it in a variety of ways.
Wain described how he has worked both as an insider and as an outsider to policy making institutions, sometimes in tune with the dialogue and sometimes as a gadfly. Levering similarly takes on both roles, as a gadfly from the outside using the media, and as an advisor engaging in dialogue as an inside.
In a recent review of Arts and Humanities in Cambridge University Levitt et al. (2010) comment that philosophical influences on policy tend to be contingent, accidental: more about old colleagues going in different directions, and about chance meetings or encounters than about 'knowledge transfer' or dissemination strategies. The authors suggest putting oneself into a position to find chance encounters, something that Wain and Levering have both done.
In conclusion, I began this paper by posing the question, 'What kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?'. Now, at the end of the paper it can be seen that the question is not well formed. The short answer is that every kind of philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers. But the significant question is, 'What kind of philosophers of education are relevant in educational policy making? The short answer to this is, 'Those who by good luck or good management engage with policy makers in some form of extended dialogue.'
With regard to its influence on policy, philosophy of education is best understood as embodied in philosophers of education who have developed a philosophical sensibility and approach which is particularly oriented to educational issues, dilemmas and problems. That is, philosophy of education is influential insofar as philosophers of education are influential whether or not they present themselves as philosophers.
VII Yes but... Some thorny issues
The last section ended with what might be taken to be an optimistic conclusion. However it raises critical issues of ethics and social justice. A full discussion would need another paper but in the final section, I outline two of the most pressing ones. argues that the likelihood of knowledge being taken seriously is highly dependent on attitudes to gender. This will be as significant both for philosophers who act as trusted colleagues and also for Socratic gadflies. We may note that Socrates was taken seriously, while the criticism of Thales by 'a maidservant from Thrace' was not (Cavarero 1995) . Similarly, surely, for class and race. Thus privilege will guarantee undue influence. The forms of reasoning, the imagery, the concepts of the right and the good, and creative conceptualisations will therefore be a particular, biased subset of possible philosophies of education.
Finally, there is ethical question which faces the author of this paper, as it does any philosopher of education, that is, a philosopher whose purposes are educational. This question is how to live a philosophical life in the fast changing world of educational practice and policy.
